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Ferguson v. City of Charleston, South Carolina
Drug Testing Pregnant Women: Is it Constitutional?
Meredith Lugo*
Can pregnant women be prosecuted in the state of South Carolina on the basis of a drug test
administered by their physician during a routine visit? The Supreme Court will answer this question,
which implicates both privacy and Fourth Amendment concerns, when it decides Ferguson v. City of
Charleston next term.
In the fall of 1989 the Medical University of South Carolina, in conjunction with the local
prosecuting attorney and chief of police, instituted a policy of testing pregnant women who came to the
hospital for pre-natal care to detect the presence of cocaine in their bodies when certain indicia of its
use were present. Under South Carolina law a viable fetus is considered a person, and therefore a
woman who ingests cocaine after her twenty-fourth week of pregnancy is guilty of distributing a
controlled substance to a minor. Positive test results were sent to the police unless the woman agreed
to undergo treatment.
Drug tests have previously been held by the Supreme Court to be searches within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. (Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 1989). The reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches (no warrant was
obtained before the drug tests at issue here were conducted). However, the Supreme Court has
recognized a "special needs" exception to this prohibition when special governmental needs, beyond
those of law enforcement, are involved. To qualify as such an exception, a search must be motivated by
concerns other than crime detection and designed for purposes other than that of law enforcement
(National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 1989; Chandler v. Miller, 1997). In these instances the
court must balance the governmental interest, the degree to which the intrusion advances this interest,
and the magnitude of the intrusion upon the individual affected. A panel majority of the Fourth Circuit
held that the government's special needs justified such an exception here; the dissent disagreed. It is
now up to the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict.
Judge William Wilkins, writing for the panel majority, contended that the policy was prompted
by, and formulated in response to, the rising use of cocaine by pregnant women and the health hazards
and drain on public resources associated with such use. The dissenting judge, in contrast, characterized
the program differently. Judge Catherine Blake in dissent, in contrast, characterized the program
differently. Because the focus of the program was the arrest and prosecution of women who tested
positive, she asserted, it could not properly be considered a special needs exception under Supreme
Court precedent. Significantly for Judge Blake, in all other cases in which the Supreme Court has
considered whether challenged drug tests fit into the special needs exception, a condition of the
searches was that the results were not handed over to law enforcement (Von Raab, 1989; Skinner, 1989;
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 1995). Judge Blake also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
tests involved only a minimal degree of intrusion because urinalysis is a routine part of a medical exam,
and the women had agreed to be examined. She emphasized that the women were unaware that their
test results would be seen not just by hospital personnel but by law enforcement as well.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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There is no question that maternal drug use poses dangers to both mother and child, as well as
society as a whole. The Supreme Court must determine whether South Carolina's method is a
permissible means of dealing with the admittedly serious problem, or an unconstitutional abridgement
of the women's Fourth Amendment rights.
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99-936 Ferguson v. Charleston, S.C.
Ruling below (4 Cir., 186 F.3d 469, 68 U.S.L.W. 1056):
State hospital's policy of testing pregnant women who show signs of drug addiction for cocaine use and
turning positive results over to law enforcement authorities for prosecution does not violate Fourth
Amendment, Tide VI of 1964 Civil Rights Act, or constitutional right to privacy.
Question presented: Was "special needs" exception to Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements properly applied to discretionary drug testing program targeting hospital patients
that was created and implemented with police and prosecutors primarily for law enforcement purposes?
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Crystal M. FERGUSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants
V.
CITY OF CHARLESTON, South Carolina, et al., Defendants-
Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
Decided July 13, 1999
WILKINS, Circuit Judge:
This litigation involves constitutional,
statutory, and common-law challenges to a
policy instituted by the Medical University of
South Carolina (MUSC) in consultation with
the Solicitor of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of
South Carolina; the City of Charleston, South
Carolina Police Department (CCPD); and
various social services agencies. The policy was
intended to encourage pregnant women whose
urine tested positive for cocaine use to obtain
substance abuse counseling. Appellants, ten
women who were tested pursuant to the policy,
brought this action claiming, inter alia, that the
testing of their urine for evidence of cocaine
use constituted a warrantless search in violation
of the Fourth Amendment; ***. The district
court entered judgment for Appellees *** on
each of these claims at various stages of the
litigation. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.
I.
In the fall of 1989, MUSC instituted a
policy providing for the testing of the urine of
pregnant women suspected of cocaine use and
for the reporting, under certain circumstances,
of test results to law enforcement officials. The
impetus behind the policy came from Nurse
Shirley Brown, a case manager in the obstetrics
department at MUSC. Brown was concerned
about a perceived rise in cocaine use among
pregnant women and the consequences for the
health of the users' children. Brown spoke with
the General Counsel for MUSC who in turn
contacted the Ninth Circuit Solicitor (chief
prosecuting attorney) concerning the
development of a policy to address the
problem. Eventually, a task force was formed
that included Nurse Brown, the Solicitor, the
Chief of CCPD, and doctors from various
departments involved in perinatal care at
MUSC. During the course of task force
meetings, the Solicitor informed the
participants that because a viable fetus was a
"person" under South Carolina law, a woman
who ingested cocaine after the 24th week of
pregnancy was guilty of the crime of
distributing a controlled substance to a person
under the age of eighteen ***.
Pursuant to the policy formulated by the
task force and implemented in late October or
early November 1989, urine drug screens to
detect evidence of cocaine use were given to all
MUSC maternity patients when certain indicia
of cocaine use were present: (1) separation of
the placenta from the uterine wall; (2)
intrauterine fetal death; (3) no prenatal care; (4)
late prenatal care (beginning after 24 weeks); (5)
incomplete prenatal care (fewer than five visits);
(6) preterm labor without an obvious cause; (7)
a history of cocaine use; (8) unexplained birth
defects; or (9) intrauterine growth retardation
without an obvious cause. When a patient
tested positive, the test result was reported to
CCPD or a representative of the Solicitor's
Office and the patient was arrested for
distributing cocaine to a minor. In early 1990,
the policy was amended so that a patient who
tested positive for cocaine use was given a
choice between being arrested and receiving
drug treatment. Positive test results of a patient
who elected drug treatment were not forwarded
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to CCPD, and the patient was not arrested,
unless she tested positive for cocaine use a
second time or failed to comply with treatment
obligations. A patient who was arrested could
avoid prosecution by completing a drug
treatment program. Upon successful
completion of such a program, the charges
would be dismissed.'
Implementation of the policy by MUSC
involved substantial record keeping and
educational efforts. A maternity patient whose
urine tested positive for cocaine use was shown
an educational video concerning the harmful
effects of cocaine use during pregnancy and
was given letters from the Solicitor's Office and
the hospital staff relating to the policy. In
addition, MUSC personnel advised the patient
of the need to obtain substance abuse
counseling and scheduled an initial
appointment for such counseling. The patient
then was given a document noting the date and
time of the appointment. Additionally, MUSC
maintained records on patients whose urine
tested positive for cocaine use as a means of
tracking them to ensure that they complied with
the requirements of the policy.
3The dissent repeatedly characterizes Appellees'
actions in implementing the policy as animated
by a vindictive purpose to prosecute women
who used cocaine during pregnancy. The
record simply does not support this. Although
the very real possibility of arrest was employed
as an incentive for women to comply with
treatment obligations, the record is abundantly
clear that Appellees were motivated by a desire
to protect the health of children born at MUSC,
and that the policy was formulated and
implemented with this goal in mind. Indeed,
the district court so found. *** And, the
evidence in the record more than amply
supports this finding. *** Indeed, while some
of the Appellants were arrested, not one of
them was prosecuted; this fact belies the
dissent's assertion that a purpose of the policy
was to convict and punish women who used
cocaine during pregnancy.
Appellants, all of whom were subjected to
the policy, brought this action asserting, as
pertinent here *** violation of their Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures; *** The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Appellees on the Fourth
Amendment claim. ***
On appeal, Appellants challenge the
submission of the Fourth Amendment claim to
the jury and the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the verdict ***.
At trial, Appellants contended that the urine
drug screens constituted searches within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. They
further claimed that because they did not
consent to the screens, the tests violated the
Fourth Amendment.' The district court ruled
that the urine screens fell within the ambit of
the Fourth Amendment and submitted the
question of whether Appellants had consented
to the searches to the jury, which found in
favor of Appellees. Appellants now maintain
that the district court erred in submitting the
issue of consent to the jury and, alternatively,
that the verdict is not supported by the
evidence. We find it unnecessary to address
these contentions because we affirm on the
basis that the searches were reasonable as
special needs searches.
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides in pertinent part that
"the right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures[ ] shall not be violated." *** Simply
put, this amendment guarantees that
governmental intrusions into privacy by means
of searches or seizures must be reasonable.
Typically, this reasonableness requirement acts
as a constraint on governmental authority to
undertake a search or seizure in the absence of
individualized suspicion. *** Generally, a search
performed without a warrant is unreasonable
5 MUSC personnel did not obtain warrants
before conducting the urine drug screens.
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per se unless it fits within a narrowly defined
exception to the warrant requirement. ***
Nevertheless, "neither a warrant nor probable
cause, nor, indeed, any measure of
individualized suspicion, is an indispensable
component of reasonableness in every
circumstance." *** Rather, there are situations
in which "a Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement." *** In such
cases, "it is necessary to balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's
interests to determine whether it is impractical
to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion in the particular
context." *** This balancing requires
consideration of the governmental interest
prompting the invasion; the effectiveness of the
intrusion, i.e., the degree to which the intrusion
reasonably is thought to advance the
governmental interest; and the magnitude of
the intrusion upon the individuals affected,
from both a subjective and objective
standpoint. ***
The parties evidently have agreed
throughout this litigation that MUSC is a state
hospital and that MUSC employees therefore
are government actors. And, the district court
found as a fact that MUSC personnel
conducted the urine drug screens for medical
purposes wholly independent of an intent to aid
law enforcement efforts.' Accordingly, the
7Te district court declined to hold the
searches at issue here reasonable under a special
needs analysis because law enforcement officers
were involved in the formulation of the policy.
However, the involvement of law enforcement
officers does not make a special needs analysis
inappropriate. ***
The dissent makes the related argument that
the use of evidence obtained during the
searches to support the arrest of some patients
precludes application of the special needs
balancing test. We disagree with this
proposition, as does the Supreme Court. See
Griffin v. Wisconsin *** (determining that
question presented is whether a balancing of
MUSC's interest in protecting the health of
children whose mothers use cocaine during
pregnancy, the effectiveness of the policy to
identify and treat women who use cocaine
during pregnancy, and the degree of intrusion
experienced by women whose urine was tested
for evidence of cocaine use results in a
conclusion that the searches violated the
Fourth Amendment.
A.
The first factor to be considered is the
governmental need. The Fourth Amendment
does not require a governmental need that is
compelling in an absolute sense. *** Instead,
the interest must be "important enough to
justify the particular search at hand, in light of
other factors that show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation
of privacy." *** The hazard giving rise to the
alleged special need must be a concrete danger,
not merely a hypothetical one. See Chandler ***;
Vernonia, (explaining that a sharp rise in drug
warrantless search based on reasonable grounds
was justified by the special needs of the
Wisconsin probation system even though
evidence gathered during the search was
employed to support a criminal conviction); see
also Sitq *** (noting that suspicionless stop at
sobriety checkpoint resulted in arrest for
driving under the influence). The dissent's
attempt to distinguish Sitq is unpersuasive. It is
true that the decision of the Court "address[ed]
only the initial stop of each motorist passing
through a checkpoint and the associated
preliminary questioning and observation by
checkpoint officers." *** However, the fact that
the initial suspicionless searches led ultimately
to an arrest cannot have escaped the attention
of the Court. If, as the dissent contends, the
intent to use information obtained during a
suspicionless seizure to further investigate and
ultimately arrest an individual rendered the
special needs analysis inappropriate, Sit. would
have been decided differently.
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use by student athletes supported school
officials' assertion that random drug testing
without individualized suspicion was
warranted).
The policy at issue here was developed after
medical personnel at MUSC noticed an
alarming increase in the number of pregnancies
affected by cocaine use. Maternal cocaine use is
associated with a number of pregnancy
complications, including low birth weight,
premature labor, birth defects, and
neurobehavioral problems. Even a single use of
cocaine during pregnancy may result in
separation of the placenta from the uterine wall
-- a condition that may threaten the life of the
mother and the fetus -- or a stroke in the fetus.
Moreover, costs related to caring for infants
exposed to cocaine in utero are substantial, as
evidenced by the testimony of an expert for
Appellants who testified that he had estimated
in the late 1980s that such expenses nationwide
might exceed three billion dollars annually over
the next ten years. In light of the documented
health hazards of maternal cocaine use and the
resulting drain on public resources, MUSC
officials unquestionably possessed a substantial
interest in taking steps to reduce cocaine use by
pregnant women. Cf. Vernonia, (concluding that
interest in deterring drug use by schoolchildren
was important in light of severe effects of drug
use on adolescents).
B.
The second factor, the effectiveness of the
search, focuses on "the degree to which [it]
advances the public interest." SitZ *** In
analyzing this factor, however, our review must
leave "the decision as to which among
reasonable alternative ... techniques should be
employed to deal with a serious public danger"
to "the governmental officials who have a
unique understanding of, and a responsibility
for, limited public resources." ***
Here, there can be little doubt that testing
the urine of maternity patients when certain
indicia of possible cocaine use were present was
an effective way to identify and treat maternal
cocaine use while conserving the limited
resources of a public hospital. Indeed, prenatal
testing was the only effective means available to
accomplish the primary policy goal of
persuading women to stop using cocaine during
their pregnancies in order to reduce health
effects on children exposed to cocaine in utero.
Appellants argue, however, that the policy
was ineffective because it was both
underinclusive and overinclusive. The policy
was underinclusive, Appellants claim, because it
did not address use of other drugs -- such as
alcohol and nicotine -- that may pose risks to a
developing fetus. And, Appellants maintain that
the policy was overinclusive because women
were tested on the basis of having received
inadequate prenatal care, a factor that
Appellants contend is more accurately
associated with poverty than with cocaine use.
Neither of these assertions, even if true, has
any bearing on the effectiveness of the means
adopted to achieve the goal of identifying and
treating maternal cocaine use among MUSC
patients. The first fails because it addresses only
the wisdom of the policy itself. And, the second
fails because the fact that the criteria for testing
under the policy did not necessarily correlate
with cocaine use in all patients did not render
those criteria ineffective. Accordingly, we
conclude that the method chosen by MUSC
officials was an effective one.
8 The dissent maintains that the urine screens
were not an effective means of identifying
cocaine use by pregnant women because some
patients were arrested after giving birth, when
"any adverse effect of maternal cocaine use on
the developing fetus had already occurred."
In applying the special needs balancing test,
however, the proper focus is not on whether
any arrests under the policy were an effective
means of advancing the identified government
interest, but rather on the effectiveness of the
urine screens. Urine screens conducted up to
the time of birth unquestionably were effective
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C.
Finally, the degree of intrusion, both
objective and subjective, suffered by Appellants
was minimal. The objective intrusion suffered
by an individual is "measured by the duration of
the seizure and the intensity of the
investigation." *** The subjective level of
intrusion is measured by the extent to which
the method chosen minimizes or enhances fear
-and surprise on the part of those searched or
detained. ***
Generally, the privacy interests implicated
by the collection and testing of urine are not
minimal. *** The context in which the searches
at issue here occurred, however, indicates that
they were only minimally intrusive. In the first
place, the collection and testing of urine was
conducted in the course of medical treatment
to which Appellants had consented. The giving
of a urine sample is a normal, routine, and
expected part of a medical examination. ***
Therefore, on an objective level, the duration
and intensity of the search indicate that the
Fourth Amendment intrusion was minimal at
best. *** With respect to the subjective level of
intrusion, we note that urine drug screens were
conducted whenever one of the criteria for
testing was met; a treating physician had no
discretion to decline to order a urine test under
the policy. *** This fact, combined with the
routine nature of urine testing in medical
examinations, indicates that the searches were
minimally intrusive on a subjective level.
D.
In sum, the rising use of cocaine by
pregnant women among MUSC's patient base
and the public health problems associated with
maternal cocaine use created a special need
beyond normal law enforcement goals; the
method chosen to address that need -- testing
to determine whether a woman had used
cocaine during her pregnancy and thus whether
her child required treatment for prenatal
exposure to cocaine.
the urine of pregnant women when indicia of
possible cocaine use were present -- effectively
advanced the public interest; and the intrusion
suffered by Appellants was minimal. Therefore,
a balancing of these factors clearly
demonstrates that the searches conducted were
reasonable and thus not violative of the Fourth
Amendment.
In sum, we reject Appellants' challenges to
the judgments in favor of Appellees.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
BLAKE, District Judge, dissenting in part:
The majority has concluded that the
warrantless testing of urine for evidence of
cocaine use which resulted in the arrest of nine
of the 10 plaintiffs in this case constituted a
reasonable search under the "special needs"
exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. On this point,
respectfully, I dissent. *** Accordingly, I would
reverse the district court's decisions concerning
the appellants' Fourth Amendment *** claims
and remand for consideration of appropriate
relief.
I.
Some additional factual background is
necessary to explain my position on the Fourth
Amendment issue. Preliminarily, assuming that
concern for the health of fetuses being carried
by pregnant women using crack cocaine was a
motivating force in the development of the
MUSC policy, it nevertheless is clear from the
record that an initial and continuing focus of
the policy was on the arrest and prosecution of
drug-abusing mothers, either before or after
they had given birth to the children presumably
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affected by the cocaine use.' The prosecutorial
purpose of the policy and the substantial
involvement of law enforcement officials from
the very beginning of its implementation are
both illustrated by a letter sent by MUSC
General Counsel Joseph C. Good to Charles
Condon, Charleston City Solicitor, on August
23, 1989. In the letter, Mr. Good wrote:
I read with great interest in Saturday's
newspaper accounts of our good friend, the
Solicitor for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit,
prosecuting mothers who gave birth to children
who tested positive for drugs. ...
Please advise us if your office is anticipating
future criminal action and what if anything our
Medical Center needs to do to assist you in this
matter.
*** In addition, operational guidelines issued by
Captain Roberts of the Charleston police force
on October 12, 1989, with copies to Solicitor
Condon and to MUSC nurse Shirley Brown
(one of the instigators of the MUSC program),
refer to the positive drug tests as "probable
cause" for arrest of the mother, on charges of
possession only if the pregnancy is 27 weeks or
less, and on charges of both possession and
distribution to persons under 18 if the
pregnancy is 28 weeks or more. *** Further, a
letter from Mr. Good to a Senior Assistant
Attorney General on December 19, 1989,
explaining the MUSC program, states that it
was developed by MUSC "at the suggestion of
law enforcement and the solicitor's office. . . "
*** These are merely a few examples of the
evidence in the record that supports a finding
of both prosecutorial intent on the part of
MUSC and substantial involvement of law
enforcement officials in developing the
program.
' As set forth in greater detail below, seven of
the plaintiffs were arrested after the birth of
their children.
Following is a short summary of the
circumstances under which the plaintiffs in this
case were tested and arrested:
In none of these cases was a warrant
obtained before the urine testing was done or
before the results were turned over to the
police and the plaintiffs were arrested.
Furthermore, the consent forms signed by the
plaintiffs did not advise them that their drug
test results would be disclosed to the police.
The majority excuses the lack of a warrant, or
indeed any determination of probable cause, by
relying on the "special needs" exception to the
ordinary Fourth Amendment requirement that
a warrant be obtained.
II.
The Supreme Court has held that:
where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
special govern mental needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance
the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it
is impractical to require a warrant or some level
of individualized suspicion in the particular
context.
National TreasuU Emplyees Union v. Von Raab,
(emphasis added). Similarly, the Court has
instructed that:
When such "special needs" -- concerns other than
crime detection -- are alleged in justification of a
Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must
undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining
closely the competing private and public
interests advanced by the parties.
Chandler v. Miller, (emphasis added). Several
aspects of the "special needs" exception require
careful analysis in the context of this case.
First, as the emphasized portions of the
above quotations make clear, the "special
needs" exception does not apply where the
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governmental intrusion is intended to be used
for law enforcement purposes. In Von Raab, the
issue was whether "it violates the Fourth
Amendment for the United States Customs
Service to require a urinalysis test from
employees who seek transfer or promotion to
certain positions." *** The Supreme Court in
that case held that the Fourth Amendment
permitted the suspicionless testing of
employees who applied for positions directly
involving the use of firearms or the interdiction
of illegal drugs. *** In reaching this conclusion,
the Court applied a "special needs" analysis,
balancing the individuals' privacy interests
against the non-law enforcement governmental
interests served by the urinalysis policy.
Significantly, in deciding to apply the "special
needs" balancing test to the facts before it, the
Court emphasized that "it is clear that the
Customs Service's drug testing program is not
designed to serve the ordinary needs of law
enforcement. Test results may not be used in a
criminal prosecution of the employee without the
employee's consent." *** In fact, in none of the
cases relied on by the majority, other than the
sobriety checkpoint and probation supervision
cases which will be addressed below, were the
results of the drug tests or other searches
intended for use in a criminal prosecution. *
In sharp contrast, nine out of ten of the
plaintiffs in this case were arrested based on the
test results, and one avoided arrest only by
committing herself to a psychiatric unit. Under
these circumstances, I believe the "special
needs" exception does not apply.
The majority cites Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sit, and Griffin v. Wisconsin for the
proposition that the defendants' intention to
use the results of the drug tests as probable
cause to arrest the plaintiffs in this case does
not preclude application of the special needs
balancing test. In Sit,-I, however, the Supreme
Court was careful to explain that the special
needs exception applied only to the
suspicionless "seizure," that is, the initial stop
of each motorist and the associated preliminary
questioning and observation, *** which the
Court characterized as only a "slight" intrusion.
*** The Court specifically noted that the
"detention of particular motorists for more
extensive field sobriety testing may require
satisfaction of an individualized suspicion
standard." The Sitk balancing test, which
justifies the relatively slight intrusion of a
checkpoint seizure, does not serve also to
justify searches of the motorists' persons or
effects without consent or probable cause. ***
Griffin also is readily distinguishable. In that
case, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of
a warrantless search conducted by a state
probation officer at the home of a criminal
defendant on probation under a regulation
which permitted such searches as long as the
probation officer had "reasonable grounds" to
believe the probationer possessed contraband
forbidden under the conditions of his
probation. The Court noted that probation was
a form of criminal sanction imposed after a
finding of guilt *** and supervision of
probationers was a "'special need' of the State
permitting a degree of impingement upon
privacy that would not be constitutional if
applied to the public at large." ***
Accordingly, I believe the majority reads
Sitk and Griffin too broadly in suggesting that
the special needs exception can justify a
suspicionless search of a member of the public
intended to produce evidence for use in a
criminal arrest.
In this case, the MUSC policy was intended
from its inception to result in the arrest and
possible prosecution of pregnant women who
were patients at the state hospital. In all the
other special needs cases cited by the majority,
arrest was at most an incidental possibility and
not a direct result of the warrantless Fourth
Amendment intrusion sought to be justified. It
is simply inconsistent with the record in this
case to identify the drug testing imposed by
MUSC as not serving normal law enforcement
needs. I would find that the avowed and actual
purpose of arresting patients who tested
positive for cocaine, as well as the extensive
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involvement of law enforcement officials in
designing and implementing the policy,
preclude application of the special needs
analysis in this case.
Even if I assume, however, that a special
needs balancing test should be applied, and
further assume that the governmental interest
identified by the majority -- i.e., the adverse
effect of maternal cocaine use on the health of
children exposed to cocaine in utero -- is
substantial, I believe that the policy fails the test
of "effectiveness," i.e., "the degree to which the
search advances the public interest." See Sitz,
***. It is undisputed that seven of the plaintiffs
were arrested after giving birth (indeed, several
were taken into custody at the hospital wearing
only their hospital gowns), rather than during
the prenatal period. By that time, any adverse
effect of maternal cocaine use on the
developing fetus had already occurred, and the
arrest could only have had a punitive rather
than a preventive purpose.
Nor is it correct to say that the degree of
intrusion on the mother's privacy was
"minimal" simply because the test occurred in
the context of a hospital examination. Unlike
the policy in Von Raab, under the MUSC policy
the test results are reported not simply to a
licensed physician, but to law enforcement
officials with no medical reason for receiving
the information. Cf. Von Raab (noting as one of
the procedures that minimized the intrusiveness
of the drug screening program that "an
employee need not disclose personal medical
information to the Government unless his test
result is positive, and even then any such
information is reported to a licensed
physician").
4 Moreover, several of the plaintiffs who were
not arrested until after giving birth had tested
positive for cocaine multiple times during the
prenatal period when, according to the
purported purpose of the policy, intervention
was crucial.
For all the above reasons, I agree with the
trial court that the drug testing policy applied to
the plaintiffs in this case violated the Fourth
Amendment, in the absence of valid consent.
The district court also properly found that
the various consent forms signed by the
plaintiffs, which did not advise them that the
drug test results would be disclosed to the
police, did not alone establish valid consent.
Accordingly, the court submitted this case to
the jury on the issue of consent, and the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
The plaintiffs moved for judgment under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50(b), and the court denied the
motion.
I disagree that the evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.
When considering a Rule 50(b) motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the district court
must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and then
determine whether a reasonable jury could draw
only one conclusion from the evidence. *** We
review the district court's ruling on a Rule 50(b)
motion by applying the same standards de
novo. *** In addition to the consent forms, the
defendants presented other evidence, such as
letters that either accompanied the forms or
were distributed after a positive test result, and
a public service announcement issued by the
Solicitor's Office in 1990. The public service
announcement indicated that pregnant women
who tested positive for drug use could be
subject to prosecution; however, it was seen by
only two of the plaintiffs. *** The plaintiffs'
presumed familiarity with this information,
even when combined with a general knowledge
that use of cocaine is illegal, is not sufficient to
establish the plaintiffs' voluntary and knowing
consent to the possible use against them in a
criminal case of drug test results taken in the
course of their pregnancy and labor. * I also
question whether consent can be voluntary, in a
constitutional sense, when given by an indigent,
uninsured woman in labor, who is dependent
on medical care provided by the state's public
11
hospital. If the special needs exception had
been held not to apply, a more thorough
analysis of this issue would have been
necessary.
IV.
In summary, I would reverse the district
court on the Fourth Amendment *** claims,
and remand for consideration of appropriate
relief. On th[is] *** issue[ ], respectfully, I
dissent.
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HOSPITAL'S AID IN ARRESTS FACES COURT
Justices to Hear Arguments in Case of South Carolina FaciUty That
Gave Polce the Names ofMothers who Took Drugs
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, February 29, 2000
David G. Savage
Again testing the frontiers in the war on
drugs, the Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide whether public hospitals and police can
work together to arrest pregnant women who
have used cocaine.
South Carolina is the only state that charges
mothers with child abuse if their babies are
born with traces of illegal drugs in their blood.
To enforce the policy, nurses and doctors at
a public hospital in Charleston, S.C.,
volunteered in 1989 to give police the names of
women who tested positive for cocaine.
"Most of us assume there is a special
confidentiality when you go to a doctor or a
hospital. These women went to the hospital for
medical care. Instead, they got arrested," said
Lynn Paltrow, a lawyer for the Women's Law
Project in Philadelphia, which sued on behalf of
the women. The group accused the hospital and
city prosecutors of conducting illegal searches
in violation of the 4th Amendment.
Paltrow said the policy was directed almost
entirely at poor, black women. Of 30 women
who were arrested, 29 of them were African
American, she said. The one white woman
arrested gave birth to a mixed-race child--a fact
that was noted by the nurses, she said.
In its defense, the hospital said it undertook
the drug testing policy to combat the epidemic
of so-called crack babies.
"This was a pathetic situation. These babies
were being born exposed to cocaine. This was a
medically driven policy to deal with a medical
crisis," said Robert H. Hood, a Charleston
lawyer who represented the Medical University
of South Carolina.
During the first year of the policy, women
who tested positive were arrested and
sometimes put in shackles immediately after
giving birth. In later years, they were given the
choice of drug treatment or arrest.
In 1993, after the lawsuit was filed, the
hospital stopped turning over drug test results
to police, but prosecutors maintain that the
joint effort was legal. Last year, the U.S. 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and threw out
the women's claim for damages.
Normally, police cannot search an
individual for evidence unless they have a
warrant and "probable cause" to believe a crime
has been committed. The 4th Amendment has
long been understood as forbidding mass
searches and roundups by police.
But amid the war on drugs, that rule has
been relaxed, or even discarded, some legal
experts say. In 1989, the Supreme Court for the
first time upheld the use of mass drug tests for
special public employees, such as customs
agents who carry guns.
Since then, broad-scale searches have been
upheld by lower courts, and the requirement of
"individualized suspicion" has faded.
But the Supreme Court may be ready to
reconsider that trend in the term that begins in
October.
Only last week, the justices announced that
they will consider the constitutionality of
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"narcotics checkpoints." City officials in
Indianapolis set up these roadblocks and used
drug-sniffing dogs to detect illegal drugs.
In the South Carolina case, the women's
lawyers said the "very integrity of the 4th
Amendment" is at stake if the government can
use routine medical tests as basis for bringing
criminal charges.
A coalition of health care groups, including
tie California Medical Assn., also urged the
court to hear the case (Ferguson vs. City of
Charleston, 99-936).
"The trust inherent in the doctor-patient
relationship was manipulated by law
enforcement authorities to obtain bodily fluids
from indigent pregnant women for use as
incriminating evidence," the medical groups
said.
If such a policy is constitutional, they said,
the privacy protection of the 4th Amendment
will mean little.
Copyright C) 2000 Times Mirror Company
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PROGRAM OF DRUG-TESTING PREGNANT WOMEN DRAWS A REVIEW BY THE
SUPREME COURT
The New York Times
Tuesday, February 29, 2000
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed today to decide
whether a South Carolina public hospital
conducted unconstitutional searches when it
tested pregnant women's urine for drugs so it
could report illegal drug use to the police.
The case is an appeal on behalf of 10
women who were arrested as a result of the
policy, some while they were still weak and
bleeding from childbirth, and who later sued. It
presents the Supreme Court a narrow but
important aspect of a legal and public policy
debate that began in the peak years of the crack
epidemic of the 1980's: the extent to which a
state may intervene to protect fetal health, and
the circumstances under which pregnant
women may be held criminally responsible for
behavior that endangers their fetuses.
A federal appeals court ruled last year that
while the urinalysis was a search, it was not
unconstitutional because it was justified by "a
special need beyond normal law-enforcement
goals," namely protecting the health and safety
of fetuses and newborn babies.
In their appeal, lawyers for the women are
arguing that this conclusion amounts to a
drastic expansion of what the Supreme Court
has previously treated as a "special-needs
exception" to the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches.
"Nearly every application of the criminal
law serves some health or safety purpose" and
so could be placed outside the protection of the
Fourth Amendment under this approach, the
women's brief said.
The appeal is supported by a coalition of
public health groups, which told the justices
that women who need prenatal care the most
will be deterred from seeking it if their drug
abuse is treated not as a medical problem but as
a criminal one.
None of the women who filed the lawsuit
were actually prosecuted, and the particular
program they are challenging ended in the mid-
1990's, after suits were filed and the United
States Department of Health and Human
Services began an investigation.
However, Lynn Paltrow, one of the
plaintiffs' lawyers and director of National
Advocates for Pregnant Women, a program of
the Women's Law Project in Philadelphia, said
today that drug testing of pregnant women
remained widespread in South Carolina under
the State Supreme Court's interpretation of the
state child endangerment law as applying not
only to children but also to viable fetuses. The
United States Supreme Court refused two years
ago to review that state court interpretation.
"No other state has gone as far as South
Carolina," Ms. Paltrow said in an interview,
adding: "No other state has made it a crime to
be pregnant and addicted. These women had a
health problem and needed medical care, but
they were taken to jail."
The lead plaintiff in the case, Crystal M.
Ferguson, tested positive for cocaine during a
prenatal visit to the hospital at the Medical
University of South Carolina, in Charleston, in
June 1991. She agreed to attend a drug abuse
counseling program, but tested positive again
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when she gave birth in August. She was
arrested three days later.
According to the city's statistics, 30 women
were arrested under the program. Charges
against all but two were dropped when the
women entered treatment. Some of the women
were taken from their hospital rooms in
handcuffs or leg shackles. The plaintiffs are
seeking damages and an injunction against
future drug testing.
Analytically, the case is quite similar to a
Fourth Amendment case the Supreme Court
accepted for review last week, on whether
police checkpoints that subject motorists to
drug-detecting dogs are constitutional. The
lower court in that case, Indianapolis v.
Edmond, rejected the government's argument
that the need to detect and deter drug
trafficking was a "special need" that justified the
warrantless searches.
In the new case, Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, No. 99-936, the city asserts that the
hospital adopted its policy, in cooperation with
the police and the local prosecutor's office, in
1989 in the face of "an epidemic of cocaine
use among its maternity patients.
"The clinical necessity for the drug screens,
the health problems associated with maternal
cocaine use and the astronomical economic
costs of caring for infants suffering from the
effects of cocaine use by their mothers all
created special needs beyond normal law-
enforcement goals," the city maintains.
That was the analysis endorsed in a 2-to-1
decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, which
affirmed a jury's verdict in favor of the hospital.
The hospital did not test all its patients,
instead singling out those it regarded as most
likely to be using drugs. The criteria included
having received no prenatal care, or care that
was late or incomplete; displaying certain
physical symptoms; unexplained preterm labor,
and known drug or alcohol abuse in the past.
Many of the public hospital's patients are poor
and black; of the 10 plaintiffs, nine are black
and one is white.
As the crack epidemic hit its peak, states
adopted varying approaches to the issue of drug
use by pregnant women. Because a number of
state courts ruled, unlike the South Carolina
Supreme Court, that a fetus could not be
considered a child for purposes of prosecuting
pregnant women under child abuse laws, some
prosecutors argued that mothers delivered
illegal drugs to their newborn babies through
the umbilical cord during the brief moments
between birth and the cutting of the cord.
A woman was convicted in Florida under
this theory in 1989, but the Florida Supreme
Court overturned the conviction three years
later, ruling unanimously that when the State
Legislature made "delivery" of illegal drugs a
crime, it did not contemplate a prosecution of
this sort.
Copyright C 2000 The New York Times
Company
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